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Digest:  People v. Lessie 
Alexandra A. Harman 
Opinion by Werdegar, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, 
Baxter, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ. 
Issue 
What test should courts apply when determining whether a 
minor defendant has “knowingly and voluntarily” waived his or 
her Miranda rights? 
Facts 
Tony Lessie, a sixteen-year-old boy, was charged with second 
degree murder and convicted at trial.1  Lessie had been involved 
in a gang-related shooting in Oceanside, wherein Rusty Seau was 
shot and killed.2  Months after the incident, Lessie was taken 
into custody, where he twice confessed to shooting Seau—once at 
the Oceanside Police Department, and a second time while being 
questioned in juvenile hall.3  Lessie claimed the judgment should 
be reversed because he never waived his Fifth Amendment 
rights, and therefore the trial court erred by admitting his 
confessions into evidence.4 
At the time, Lessie had finished the tenth grade and worked 
in retail.5  Lessie also had experience with the criminal justice 
system as a result of two prior arrests, one for burglary and the 
other for evading police after being stopped in his car with 
marijuana.6  Following the arrest relating to the shooting, 
Detective Kelly Deveney told Lessie that he would be able to call 
as many people as he wished when they arrived at the police 
department.7  Deveney also asked Lessie if he would like to 
contact anyone in particular, and Lessie responded in the 
 
 1 People v. Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th 1152, 1157 (2010). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 1169. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 1158. 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 5:33 PM 
518 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:517 
affirmative identifying that person as his father, although Lessie 
did not have his father’s phone number at the time.8 
Upon arrival at the Oceanside Police Department, Deveney 
informed Lessie that she had retrieved his father’s phone 
number, and she asked whether Lessie preferred to call or to 
have the department call on his behalf.9  Lessie stated that he 
would like to make the phone call himself.10  After this 
statement, Deveney, with Detective Gordon Govier in the room, 
requested that Lessie fill out paperwork and thereafter informed 
Lessie of his Miranda rights.11  When Deveney asked Lessie if he 
understood what she said, he said “yeah.”12  Next, Deveney began 
questioning Lessie about his background and the background of 
the gang members who were present the day of the shooting, 
without offering Lessie access to a phone.13 
Subsequently, Deveney told Lessie that various people, 
including family members, had identified him as the killer.14  
Lessie initially denied his role in the shooting, but then he 
confessed, stating, “I was there, I was, I was there and I was the 
shooter.”15  Lessie claimed that the gang members, specifically 
James Turner, forced him to shoot Seau as a type of initiation, 
and Lessie thought he would receive serious bodily injury if he 
did not comply with the instructions.16  Lessie confessed that 
upon Turner’s command he shot Seau in the back while Seau was 
retreating.17  After his confession, Deveney asked if Lessie would 
like a moment, and Lessie responded that he wanted to call his 
father.18  Deveney then stepped out of the room to confer with 
Govier, and Lessie again asked to call his father.19  Deveney told 
Lessie that a phone was being charged in order for him to make a 
phone call, but before she allowed him to call she continued to 
ask questions about the other gang members.20  Once the phone 
 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (stating that any individual 
held in custody must be informed of the privilege against “self-incriminatory statements” 
by being told that he has “the right to remain silent . . . the right to the presence of an 
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to 
any questioning if he so desires”). 
 12 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1158–59. 
 13 Id. at 1159.  Lessie stated that he was not a part of the gang, but he wanted to 
become a member. Id. at 1157. 
 14 Id. at 1159. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 1157. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 1159. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 1160. 
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was brought inside, Lessie called his father and left a message 
stating that he was in custody and instructed his father to call 
him as soon as possible.21 
Four months passed before Deveney and Govier conducted a 
second interview, while Lessie was in juvenile hall.22  Again, 
detectives informed Lessie of his Miranda rights.23  Lessie 
answered their questions, reiterated his involvement in the 
shooting, and filled in factual gaps.24 
At trial, Lessie argued that People v. Burton25 required the 
court to exclude his confession from trial because he maintained 
his privilege against self-incrimination during the initial 
interrogation by requesting to call his father.26  Lessie further 
argued that the second interrogation at juvenile hall was 
improper because he never waived his Miranda rights, and thus 
Edwards v. Arizona27 prohibited detectives from initiating 
further questioning.28  Lastly, Lessie motioned for exclusion 
based on a violation of Welfare & Institutions Code section 627(b) 
by law enforcement in failing to allow him a phone call within 
one hour after confinement.29  The trial court rejected all of these 
arguments and allowed Lessie’s confession into evidence at 
trial.30  The trial court observed that Burton was no longer 
controlling in light of the 1982 Truth-in-Evidence provision in the 
California Constitution, which precludes a court from excluding 
“relevant evidence . . . whether heard in juvenile or adult 
court.”31  The trial court instead applied Fare v. Michael C.32 and 
People v. Hector33 and denied that Lessie intended to invoke his 
 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. 
 24 Lessie, Cal. 4th at 1160. 
 25 People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375 (1971).  See infra, note 41 and accompanying text. 
 26 Lessie, Cal. 4th at 1162.  In Burton, the court formulated a distinct test for cases 
involving minor defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege by holding that 
a minor maintains this privilege upon a request to see a parent either before or during 
interrogation. Id. at 1163 (quoting Burton, 6 Cal. 3d at 383–84). 
 27 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).  See infra, note 28. 
 28 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1160 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85).  The court in 
Edwards stated that “an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–
85.  Thus, Lessie contends that he should not have been subjected to further questioning 
after the initial meeting with detectives where he requested to call his father. 
 29 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1161. 
 30 Id. at 1160–61. 
 31 Id. at 1160 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2)). 
 32 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).  See infra, note 47 and accompanying 
text. 
 33 People v. Hector, 83 Cal. App. 4th 228 (2000). 
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Fifth Amendment right by requesting to speak with his father 
because Lessie never explicitly stated such a purpose.34  In 
finding that Lessie waived his Fifth Amendment rights, Edwards 
could not apply.35  The court also held that the violation of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code did not justify the remedy of 
evidence exclusion.36 
On appeal, the trial court’s conviction was affirmed.37  Lessie 
petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court granted it.38 
Analysis 
The court cited Miranda to reiterate the foundation for 
protecting the Fifth Amendment by allowing individuals in 
custody the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.39  
Next, the court looked to the appropriate application of Miranda 
to cases involving minor defendants.  The court considered the 
rationales of Burton and Fare to determine whether a minor’s 
request to speak with a parent was sufficient to invoke the minor 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.40 
In Burton, the court reversed a sixteen-year-old male’s 
conviction for murder because his confession was wrongly 
admitted into evidence after the minor had requested and been 
refused the opportunity to speak with his father.41  The court in 
Burton stated that a minor defendant may maintain his Fifth 
Amendment rights by “[a]ny words or conduct which ‘reasonably 
appears inconsistent with a present willingness on the part of the 
suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with police at 
that time . . . .’”42  The Burton court held that a minor defendant 
calling upon a parent while in custody was sufficient to invoke 
the Fifth Amendment privilege.43 
The court reasoned that Burton had been limited by the 1982 
provision of the state Constitution, entitled Truth-in-Evidence, 
which prohibited courts from excluding any evidence relevant to 
criminal proceedings dealing with either adults or minors.44  
 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 1160–61. 
 36 Id. at 1161. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 1162 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45, 467, 473–74 (1966)). 
 40 Id. at 1162–68. 
 41 Id. at 1162 (citing People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375 (1971)). 
 42 Burton, 6 Cal. 3d at 382 (quoting People v. Randall, 1 Cal.3d 948, 956 (1970)). 
 43 Id. at 383–84. 
 44 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1163 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2)) (stating that 
“[t]he 1982 Truth-in-Evidence provision provides that ‘relevant evidence shall not be 
excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and 
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Despite this limitation, the court acknowledged the need to follow 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda, which “bind[s] the 
state courts under the federal Constitution’s supremacy clause 
despite the Truth-in-Evidence provision.”45  The court then 
recognized that although Burton had never been “expressly 
overruled,” the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fare proves that 
Burton is no longer good law.46 
In Fare, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s 
decision to exclude a sixteen-year-old’s confession in a case where 
the minor defendant’s request to see his probation officer had 
been denied prior to the interrogation that elicited his 
confession.47  The lower court in Fare had applied the Burton 
rationale in stressing that a minor’s relationship with his or her 
probation officer is similar to that of a “personal advisor who 
would understand his problems and needs and on whose advice 
the minor could rely.”48  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court’s decision based on the rationale that an attorney is 
situated to provide unique assistance within the criminal justice 
system that neither a probation officer nor another adult of close 
relation to a minor can provide.49  The high court further 
reasoned that when a minor makes no explicit request to speak 
with an attorney: 
[T]he determination whether statements obtained during custodial 
interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon 
an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and 
voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the 
assistance of counsel.50 
The court used this rationale to address Lessie’s argument 
distinguishing the situation in Fare, where a minor defendant 
requested to speak with his probation officer, from the situation 
in Burton, where the minor requested to speak with a parent.51  
The court stated that the rationale in Fare cannot be read so 
narrowly as to not extend to the situation presented by Burton.52  
The court further identified the other factors to be considered 
under the totality of the circumstances approach, including an 
 
hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in 
juvenile or adult court.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 45 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1164 (internal citations omitted). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 1165 (quoting In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 476 (1978)). 
 49 Id. at 1165 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 722 (1979)). 
 50 Id. at 1165–66 (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 724–25). 
 51 Id. at 1165. 
 52 Id. 
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“evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, 
background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the 
capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his 
Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those 
rights.”53 
Lastly, the court reiterated the difficulties courts have 
encountered in attempting to reconcile Burton and Fare.54  The 
court also acknowledged the need for courts to proceed cautiously 
in determining whether a minor acts knowingly and 
voluntarily.55  Ultimately, the court reasoned that, in light of the 
California Constitution’s Truth-in-Evidence provision and the 
federal law according to both Miranda and Fare, the totality of 
the circumstances test is appropriate.56 
Based on the totality of the circumstances test, the court 
considered both Lessie’s request to see his father as well as his 
background, education, and age.57  Accordingly, the court 
reasoned that Lessie did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights 
because he explicitly stated that he understood his Miranda 
rights as read to him, he had prior experience with the criminal 
justice system that did not indicate otherwise, and he never 
indicated any explicit intention to seek counsel or to remain 
silent.58 
Holding 
The court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision.  The court 
held that the appropriate test to apply to determine whether a 
minor defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth 
Amendment right is the totality of the circumstances test from 
Fare.59  While the court did not give weight to a violation of a 
defendant’s right to make a telephone call within one hour of 
confinement, the court considered the purpose of a defendant’s 
statement that might indicate a desire to maintain his Fifth 
Amendment rights in addition to the relevant circumstances.60  
In this case, the court decided that Lessie made no such 
indication by merely requesting to speak with his father in light 
of the fact that Lessie had prior experience with the criminal 
justice system.61  Thus, based on the relevant circumstances, the 
 
 53 Id. at 1167 (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 725). 
 54 Id. at 1167–68. 
 55 Id. at 1166–67. 
 56 Id. at 1168. 
 57 Id. at 1169. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1170. 
 61 Id. at 1169–70. 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 5:33 PM 
2011] People v. Lessie 523 
court found that Lessie knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
Fifth Amendment right because: (1) he was informed of his 
Miranda rights and confirmed that he understood them; (2) he 
possessed a background consistent with such an understanding 
due to his prior arrests and education level; (3) he gave no 
explicit indication that he desired to invoke his Fifth Amendment 
right; and (4) he agreed to answer interrogation questions.62 
Legal Significance 
The court’s decision limits the manner in which courts may 
interpret a minor defendant’s invocation of his or her Fifth 
Amendment rights during interrogation by overruling the Burton 
decision.  A minor’s request to speak with a parent will no longer 
suffice as an automatic invocation of the privilege.  Instead, 
under the totality of the circumstances test, courts are granted 
the flexibility to consider the relevant circumstances surrounding 
an interrogation in addition to statements made by a minor 
defendant.  In this case, the court rejected the rule in Burton and 
adopted the totality of the circumstances approach from Fare. 
 
 62 Id. 
